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Statistics as Evidence of Age
Discrimination
By Gregory L. Harper*
The use of statistics as circumstantial evidence of both dispa-
rate impact and disparate intent1 has become a mainstay of em-
ployment discrimination litigation.2 This is a result of the judicial
recognition that unlawful discrimination may be subtle and lacking
in direct evidence.3 The diversity of employment discrimination
cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' has
resulted in considerable refinement of and reliance upon statistical
evidence.5
In 1967, Congress chose to enact the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act6 (ADEA) rather than merely amend Title VII to
include age as a protected classification.7 Nevertheless, the courts
* B.S., B.A., 1972, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. Member, Second Year
Class.
1. See text accompanying notes 24-26 infra.
2. "Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have frequently relied
upon statistical evidence to prove a violation." United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443
F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (footnote omitted).
3. See Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
5. "Statistical proof has continued to dominate employment discrimination cases." B.
SCHLEI & P. GRoSSMAN, EMPLoYMENT DISCRIMNATION LAW 318 (Supp. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as SCHLEI & GRossmAN].
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
7. In January, 1967, President Johnson's annual message to the Senate called for and
outlined the legislation that would later be enacted as the ADEA. His call did not surprise
the Congress. He had already issued Executive Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-1965
Comp.), banning age discrimination by government contractors. In 1965, the Secretary of
Labor, pursuant to a statutory mandate in § 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-14 (1976), had already issued a report to Congress on age discrimination. Some mem-
bers of Congress believed that an amendment of the Civil Rights Act to include age as a
protected classification would be the best course, but others believed that enforcement
would be more efficient through the procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979), rather than under the supervision of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The latter view prevailed, and separate legislation
was passed. Nevertheless, the EEOC did take over enforcement responsibility from the La-
bor Department in July, 1979. See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment
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were quick to analogize the ADEA to Title VII, and to utilize their
Title VII experience in the judicial enforcement of the ADEA. In
one of the earliest ADEA cases, Hodgson v. First Federal Savings,"
the Fifth Circuit stated that "[w]ith a few minor exceptions the
prohibitions of [the ADEA] are in terms identical to those of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 except that 'age' has been sub-
stituted for 'race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' ", The
First Circuit recently reiterated this view in Loeb v. Textron,
Inc.,10 stating:
[O]ne naturally might expect to use the same methods and bur-
dens of proof under the ADEA as under Title VI. Nothing in
either the ADEA or its legislative history indicates a different
conclusion.
The mere fact that Congress chose to pass a separate statute
rather than to amend Title VII does not imply that age discrimi-
nation was intended to be subject to different standards and
methods of proof than race or sex discrimination.11
Courts faced with ADEA claims thus have used Title VII rul-
ings in determining whether a prima facie case,12 or causation,13
has been established, evaluating motions for a directed verdict,14
and resolving disputes relating to notice and time limitations.15
Moreover, the use of statistics to prove unlawful age discrimination
has been expressly allowed based on its analogous use in Title VII
cases.
16
This Note first reviews the use of statistical evidence in Title
VII cases and its applicability to ADEA cases. It next examines the
statistical characteristics peculiar to age discrimination as com-
pared to race or sex discrimination, and proposes methods of sta-
Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REV. 380 (1976).
8. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
9. Id. at 820 (footnote omitted).
10. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
11. Id. at 1015.
12. See notes 101-108 & accompanying text infra.
13. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 1975).
14. Id. at 311-12.
15. See Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978).
16. See Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (citing the
Title VII case, Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970)). See also
Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7902 (D.N.M. 1977), afl'd sub. noma. EEOC
v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,175 (10th Cir. 1980). For a contrary view, see notes
89-92 & accompanying text infra.
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tistical analysis specifically applicable to age discrimination litiga-
tion. The Note concludes that statistical I evidence is valid in ADEA
cases, but because the characteristic of age is different from that of
race or sex, different statistical tests should be employed in ADEA
as compared to Title VII litigation.
The Use of Statistics in Title VII Cases
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,17 held: "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motiva-
tion." ' The consequences of discrimination are most effectively
demonstrated by statistics-numerical analysis that illustrates how
and to what extent a protected class19 of individuals is adversely
affected by a particular employment practice.20 Griggs itself illus-
trates this point in that only statistical evidence was presented,
and on its strength the Court found unlawful discrimination.21
Five years after Griggs, in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,22 the Supreme Court expressly ad-
dressed the use of statistical evidence in Title VII cases, while also
distinguishing between the two types of Title VII claims: "dispa-
rate treatment" and "disparate impact."2" In a disparate treatment
case, the plaintiff must allege that, because of the plaintiff's race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex, the employer has intention-
ally treated him or her differently from other employees.2" Hence,
a disparate treatment case ultimately requires proof of a discrimi-
natory motive (intent).2" In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff
17. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
18. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
19. Individuals of any particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin are the
protected class of individuals under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). Under
the ADEA, the protected class of individuals consists of employees aged 40-70 years. 29
U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. 1I 1979).
20. See SCHLI & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1162-63.
21. To have been hired at Duke Power, an applicant must either have had a high
school diploma or have passed an achievement exam. Statistical evidence demonstrated
that, statewide, 34% of the white males had completed high school, while only 12% of the
black males had done so, and that 58% of the white applicants were able to pass the
achievement exam compared to 6% of the blacks. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
22. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
23. Id. at 335 n.15.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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must allege that the employer has unnecessarily utilized a facially
neutral employment practice that unintentionally has had an ad-
verse effect on a protected class. 6
Whereas Griggs showed the power of statistics in disparate
impact cases,2 7 the Teamsters Court commented on the use of sta-
tistics in disparate treatment cases.28 The Court held that although
proof of discriminatory motive is critical in disparate treatment
cases, it could "in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of [statistical] differences in treatment."'29
Statistically, the distinction between disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment cases is important because, although statistical
evidence alone will often be determinative in a disparate impact
case as it was in Griggs, it can only raise an inference of discrimi-
natory intent in a disparate treatment case such as Teamsters.0
As the Court in Teamsters noted: "[T]his was not a case in
which the government relied on 'statistics alone.' The individuals
who testified about their personal experiences with the company
brought the cold numbers convincingly to life."3 1 The Court then
reasoned that, in a disparate treatment case, the most important
function of statistical evidence is to help establish the prima facie
case.
3 2
26. Id. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
27. See text accompanying note 21 supra. See generally Shoben, Probing the Discrim-
inatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under
Title VII, 56 Tsx. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1977).
28. 431 U.S. at 339 n.20.
29. Id. at 335 n.15. Regardless of whether disparate impact or disparate treatment is
at issue, statistical evidence should never be ignored, because "[o]ur cases make it unmis-
takably clear that '[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important
'role' in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue." Id. at 339 (quot-
ing Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974)).
30. "Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this
one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in
time result in a work force [representative of the community]." 431 U.S. at 339 n.20.
31. Id. at 339.
32. "We have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof, where it reached pro-
portions comparable to those in this case [9% of the lower level employees were of a minor-
ity race, but only 0.7% of the upper level employees were of a minority race], to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection cases. Statistics are equally compe-
tent in proving employment discrimination." Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). See gen-
erally Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with
Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. Rv. 1, 42-43 (1977).
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The Prima Facie Case
The plaintiff in a Title VII action bears the critical burden of
establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination.33 In
a disparate impact case this consists of establishing the plaintiff as
a member of a protected class of individuals, describing the facially
neutral employment practice, and demonstrating, usually by
means of statistics, the extent of the adverse impact on the plain-
tiff's class.34
A prima facie case of disparate treatment may be established
in either of two ways. Under the approach generally used in suits
by an individual, the plaintiff must show that he or she was a
member of a protected class of individuals, that he or she was de-
nied an actual, existing employment opportunity,35 that he or she
was qualified for that opportunity, and that the opportunity was
given to an individual who was not a member of the protected
class.36 Under the approach generally used in class actions, the
plaintiffs must show that they are members of a protected group,
that they were denied employment opportunities, and that the de-
nials came during a period when the defendant was exhibiting a
"pattern or practice"37 of discrimination against the protected
group.38 In none of the models is it necessary to show discrimina-
tory motive or intent at the prima facie stage.39
33. 431 U.S. at 336 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975));
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
34. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally
Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination
Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. Rnv. 1, 11-12 (1979).
35. "Opportunity" includes hiring, promotion, or job retention possibilities.
36. This model is patterned after the model used in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Milton v. Brown, 471 F. Supp. 150
(D.D.C. 1979).
37. Although the phrase "pattern or practice" appears verbatim in § 707(a) of Title
VII, it is not a term of art, but is intended to reflect its usual meaning. See International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977); United States v. Iron-
workers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
38. This method was used in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977) (discussed at notes 23-33 & accompanying text supra). See Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). For an analysis of Teamsters and Hazel-
wood, see Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
39. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See generally Scmm &
GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1154, 1158; Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie
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Issues in Title VII Statistics
The Model
Statistical evidence of discrimination consists of a comparison
between an actual employment situation or series of events and a
model of what the situation would be, or how the events would
have transpired, 0 if the situation or events were determined solely
by chance.41 The existence of the model is theoretical and there-
fore usually not overtly stated. In Teamsters, for example, when
the Court disparaged the fact that eighty percent of the nonwhite
employees held lower paying jobs while only thirty-nine percent of
the white employees held such jobs, 42 the Court must implicitly
have considered a model situation in which the two percentages
were closer together. To formulate such a model the Court must
have made two assumptions: (1) that the nonwhite employees were
as competent to hold the higher paying jobs as the white employ-
ees and (2) that racial discrimination was not a factor in determin-
ing which employees would receive the higher paying jobs. These
two assumptions defined the model to which the actual occurrence
was compared.'
A common misconception is that the model only suggests a
single "ideal" guideline to be tempered by common sense al-
lowances. In Teamsters, for example, although absolute equality
between the two percentages would be ideal, common sense dic-
tates that there probably would be some "accidental" disparity be-
tween whites and nonwhites even if equal competency existed and
no racial discrimination were present. Statisticians term this likely
disparity "chance variability."44
Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 13
(1979); Schickman, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the McDonnell Douglas Formula in
Jury Actions under the ADEA, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1239 (1981); Shoben, Probing the Discrim-
inatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under
Title VII, 56 TEx. L. Rsv. 1, 42 (1977).
40. A comparison of an employment situati6n at some instant in time, like a snapshot,
is termed "static." A comparison of a job history consisting of several events over an interval
of time, like a motion picture, is termed "flow." See generally Scmm & GRoSSmAN, supra
note 5, at 1161-65.
41. See M. ORKm & R. DROGIN, VrrAL STATISTICS 38 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ORKN
& DROGIN].
42. 431 U.S. at 337-38.
43. See D. FREEDMAN, R. PISANI & R. PURvES, STATISTICS 497 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as FREsEVMA].
44. Id. at 244-45.
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While chance variability indicates that a particular outcome of
any system cannot be predicted with certainty, it also indicates
that, over many operations, the overall performance of a system
becomes predictable if the performance of each operation is deter-
mined solely by chance.45 The "ideal" result ends up as only the
most frequent result, the mode"4 within a range of possible results,
each with its own probability of occurrence. 40 7 By adding together
the probabilities of successive possible results, it can be deter-
mined how often resultant values will be either greater or less than
some chosen limit.48 By choosing the actual result as the limit, it
can be determined how often the chance model would have pre-
dicted a result greater or less than thp actual occurrence.49
At some point, termed the "level of significance," 50 it is said
that because the model would have produced that high or that low
a result only a small percentage of the time, then the actual occur-
rence was probably determined by something other than pure
45. Id. at 255-60; ORKIN & DROGIN, supra note 41, at 38.
46. See J. FPEuND & F. WLAMms, M NTARY BUSINESS STATISTIcs-THE MODERN
APPROACH 42 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FREUND & WxwAi.s]. In a normal distribu-
tion, see note 121 infra, the mode is also the average. See FRm AN, supra note 43, at 70-
73.
47. For example, suppose that the resultant distribution of the number of times a fair
coin landed "heads" when tossed 100 times in each of 100 trials was:
number
of
trials
10 X
9 x
8 x
7 x X X
6 x •
5 •
4 X X X
3 • •
2 X x
1 • X x •
36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
number of heads
This distribution shows, for example, that in 6 out of the 100 trials, the number of heads
tossed was 55.
48. The distribution, see note 47 supra, also shows that 41 or fewer heads were tossed
in 4 out of the 100 trials.
49. If another coin had been tossed 100 times and came up heads 41 times, it could be
said that if the coin were fair it would have come up with a greater number of heads 96% of
the time.
50. See generally FREMnmAN, supra note 43, at 442; ORKiN & DROGIN, supra note 41, at
May 1981] STATISTICS AS EVIDENCE
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chance.5 1 The model is then rejected as not being descriptive of the
actual system.52 If a court's assumption of equal competency was
not shown to be erroneous,53 the court would regard the assump-
tion of nondiscrimination as incorrect. Statisticians term the nec-
essary abandonment of the model's nondiscrimination assumption
as a "rejection of the null hypothesis."'" The rejection of the null
hypothesis constitutes evidence of discrimination.
The choice of a particular level of significance55 is subjective.5 6
Scientists, to compare the quality of each other's data, have set
some standard levels. One standard level is a five percent level of
significance. Some commentators suggest that the five percent 57
level of significance was chosen because the early abbreviated sta-
tistical tables included that level. 8 A more generous view is that
the five percent level was chosen because, being two standard devi-
ations from the average,59 it is relatively easy to calculate. Most
modern statisticians are critical of using five percent or any other
level as an absolute standard of significance.6 0 Nevertheless, many
courts have followed the scientist's path and used the five percent
level as a determination of valid statistical evidence,"' and no court
has yet challenged the scientific standard as being inapplicable to
legal determinations.
A somewhat greater amount of legal attention has been fo-
cused on the subjective decision whether a one-tailed or a two-
tailed test is to be used with a particular level of significance. A
one-tailed test focuses on how often the model produces a value
either greater or lesser than the actual occurrence,62 while a two-
tailed test focuses on how often the model produces a result more
51. See FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 442.
52. Id. at 444.
53. Id. at 491-92.
54. Id. at 444. See also Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its
Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTiNGS L.J. 59, 68-69 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Braun]. See notes 77-78 & accompanying text infra.
55. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
56. See FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 493.
57. The 5% level of significance may also be referred to as its 95% counterpart.
58. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 493-94.
59. Id. at 61.
60. Id. at 494.
61. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.14 (1977);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430, 437 (1975); Chance v. Board of Examiners
of N.Y., 330 F. Supp. 203, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
62. See note 48 supra.
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extreme from the average than the actual occurrence."3 In discrimi-
nation practice, a two-tailed test considers the occurrence of "re-
verse" discrimination to be as possible as the discrimination at is-
sue, while the one-tailed test does not. From the plaintiffs point of
view, because the possibility of reverse discrimination in most
cases is remote or is not at issue, one-tailed tests are sufficient."
Some statisticians, however, believe that most uses of one-tailed
tests are "data mining"65 per se. Although the practical difference
between the two tests at the five percent level of significance is
slight, it can affect the outcome in "borderline" cases. This Note
uses both one-tailed and two-tailed tests to illustrate the difference
that the use of a particular test can make in close cases.
The Population
The most common factual dispute in Title VII cases involves
the question of who should be included in the actual experience
that is to be compared to the model, or, more technically, how is
the relevant population to be determined. The relevant popula-
tion is usually defined as all individuals who were available and
qualified for the job opportunity.6 7
In discrimination cases involving hiring practices, the relevant
population usually comes from the surrounding community and is
therefore external to the employer's work force.68 Issues that can
63. Most statisticians would consider the test of significance formulated in note 49,
supra, as improper. The proper test in that instance is two-tailed because bias can be in the
form of too many heads as well as too few heads. Tosses of 59 or more heads are just as
unlikely to occur as tosses of 41 or fewer, and therefore are just as indicative of possible
bias. If the five "59 or more" occurrences are added to the four "41 or fewer" occurrences,
then the model would have produced a result less extreme than 41 heads only 91% of the
time.
64. Braim, supra note 54, at 68-69.
65. "Data mining" is the statistician's term for manipulating data to prove a desired
result. See FR mAN, supra note 43, at 494-96. "Too many use statistics as a drunk man
uses a lamppost-for support and not for illumination." Keely v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
404 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Mo. 1975). See generally D. HuFF, How To LE wri STATISTICS
(1954).
66. "Population" is a term of art in statistics and refers to the entire universe of indi-
viduals possessing one or more characteristics in common. FREDMAN, supra note 43, at 301.
67. See generally Braun, supra note 54, at 62-67.
68. See generally ScHLIS & GROSSUAN, supra note 5, at 1162-65. In ADEA cases, be-
cause a large and indeterminable portion of the older persons in a community are not avail-
able for work, the requirement of availability usually precludes comparisons between the
work force and the community. But cf. Poistorff v. Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17, 22 (N.D. Ala.
1978) (comparing the percentage of executives over the age of 55 in a particular federal
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arise in these cases include determining the geographic boundaries
and other characteristics of the community.6 9 In addition, if the
hiring opportunity requires special skills, education, or experience,
the relevant population must be restricted further to include only
those members of the community who possess these requisites. 0
If the issue coricerns promotions or firings, 1 the relevant pop-
ulation is internal to the employer's work force, consisting of that
portion of the work force qualified and available to perform the
job. In such cases, determination of the necessary qualifications
and which employees possess those qualifications is often at
issue.72
The Sample
The employer's selection of individuals from the population to
be either hired, promoted, or fired, statistically is termed the
"sample" and is to be compared with the spectrum of possible
samples that the chance model generates. The possible samples
generated by the model are solely determined by chance, and
therefore termed "simple random samples."7 3 Certain assumptions
must be made regarding the nature of the actual sample in order
that it too may be considered random and, as such, comparable to
the model's samples.
Of course, actual samples are not random. Employers make
each employment decision by considering many factors of compe-
tence in addition to the minimal qualifications that determine the
population. Most of these additional factors are legitimate. If it is
assumed, moreover, that these legitimate factors are independent
of race or sex, a selection based solely on legitimate factors would
be random with respect to race or sex.
In a Title VII disparate treatment case, the plaintiff contends
that one of the factors the employer considered in choosing the
agency with the overall percentage of executives over the age of 55 in all federal agencies).
69. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977).
70. Id. at 308 n.13. See Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
See generally Braun, supra note 54, at 62-67.
71. "Firing" includes "forced retirements," "accepted resignations," and other such
euphemisms.
72. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 555 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1977); Pack v. Energy
Research & Dev. Administration, 566 F.2d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1977).
73. See FREzamAN, supra note 43, at 308; ORKn & DROGIN, supra note 41, at 7; Braun,
supra note 54, at 70 n.64.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
sample was race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. These are
illegitimate factors per se; the conscious use of any one of them is
unlawful discrimination. In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff
does not maintain that one of these factors was used consciously
by the employer, but that a seemingly neutral factor that the em-
ployer did use was irrelevant to competency and unintentionally
biased members of the protected class from obtaining the employ-
ment opportunity.74 The use of that factor is unlawful discrimina-
tion.75 For both disparate impact and disparate treatment cases, by
assuming that the use of legitimate factors will not affect the ran-
dom nature of the sample with respect to race or sex, statistical
analysis can evaluate the actual result in terms of the ideal model.
Title VII Percentage Analysis
Most Title VII statistics compare the percentage of protected
individuals in the actual sample-those individuals hired, pro-
moted, or fired by the employer-with the ideal or expected per-
centage as predicted by the model, which is the percentage of pro-
tected individuals in the population from which the employer
chose.7 6 The employer will maintain that any difference in percent-
age results solely from chance variability 7 Conversely, the plain-
tiff will argue that the difference in percentages is attributable to
unlawful discrimination. 8 In both disparate impact and disparate
treatment cases, if the difference is dramatic on its face, complete
statistical analysis may not be necessary 79 Many courts, in such
instances, have chosen to interpret statistics in their "rough"
form. 0 But if the difference, while favoring the plaintiff, is not dra-
74. See note 21 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
76. For'example, if the population consisted of 20% women, the sample would be ex-
pected to include approximately 20% women. Although the sample percentage may not be
exactly 20%, if the sample is relatively large, see FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 329-33, it will
be close to that figure, and large deviations rarely will occur. See generally Braun, supra
note 54, at 76-80.
77. This is the "null hypothesis." See Braun, supra note 54, at 68-69.
78. This is the alternative hypothesis. Id. In discrimination cases the presumption
(null hypothesis) is always the same-that the observed difference is the result of chance
and that the defendant did not engage in discriminatory practices. The alternative hypothe-
sis is the plaintiff's allegation-that the difference was the result of the defendant's discrim-
inatory practices. i
79. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir. 1970);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
80. See generally ScHiL & GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1184-86.
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matic, the statistical model can generate the percentage of samples
that would have been less discriminatory if chance were the only
determinant.8 1 If ninety-five percent82 or more of the model's sam-
ples would have been less discriminatory, most courts will hold
that unlawful discrimination is evident, and the prima facie case
established."I
The Application of Title VII to Age Discrimination
Although Title VII has often been used as a guideline in age
discrimination litigation,' several courts have cautioned against
strained applications of Title VII law in ADEA cases. In Laugesen
v. Anaconda Co., 85 the Sixth Circuit used Title VII for guidance in
evaluating motions for a directed verdict 6 and in determining cau-
sation,7 yet emphasized:
We do not here decide whether Congress intended that actions
under the [ADEA] must invariably be guided by the law applica-
ble to Title VII cases. That the law is embodied in a separate act
and has its own unique history [should] at least counsel the ex-
aminer to consider the particular problems sought to be reached
by the statute.88
In Rodriguez v. Taylor,8 9 the Third Circuit stated that al-
though Title VII experience was a useful guideline for most age
issues, equal competency should not be as automatically presumed
in ADEA cases as in Title VII cases. 90 Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel
Corp.91 broadly attacked the use of statistical evidence in ADEA
81. See notes 47-49 & accompanying text supra. The various tests used in Title VII
statistics have been well covered in the literature. See generally Braun, supra note 54, Daw-
son, Probabilities and Prejudice in Establishing Statistical Inferences, 13 JURMu J. 191
(1973); Grady, Statistics in Employment Discrimination, 30 LAB. L.J. 748 (1979); Shoben,
Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91
HARv. L. REv. 793 (1978); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. Rzv. 387 (1975); Note, Statistics and
Title VII Proof: Prima Facie Case and Rebuttal, 15 Hous. L. REv. 1030 (1978).
82. See note 57 supra.
83. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
84. See notes 8-16 & accompanying text supra.
85. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
86. Id. at 311-12.
87. Id. at 316.
88. Id. at 312 (footnote omitted).
89. 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1977).
90. 569 F.2d at 1236-37 (there may be statistically significant correlations between
bona fide necessary qualifications and age).
91. 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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cases, holding that "statistics in age discrimination litigation can-
not be used exclusively to establish a prima facie case ....
[T]here are persuasive reasons, in this court's opinion, for placing
less weight on statistical evidence in age discrimination cases. ' 2 It
is important, therefore, to recognize the differences between Title
VII and ADEA cases that affect the use of statistical evidence in
each.
The Impact-Treatment Dichotomy
Until recently, the courts considering ADEA cases have been
hesitant to recognize disparate impact fact situations. In Coates v.
National Cash Register Co.,98 for example, the defendant employer
had introduced a new line of electronic machines to replace its
older mechanical models. A training program was instituted in
which younger, newly hired employees, rather than existing field
service employees, were trained on the new machines. Eventually,
the field service employees who could only service the mechanical
models were laid off because they did not have training in electron-
ics.94 Although the facts of the case were classically fitted to the
disparate impact model,95 the court ruled that, while the layoffs
were not intentionally discriminatory, the training program was,"
thereby placing the case within the disparate treatment model.
In the case of Geller v. Markham,97 however, the court did
confront the issue of whether a disparate impact claim was valid in
age discrimination cases. The Geller court found that the defen-
dant employer's practice of giving preference in hiring to teacher
applicants of lesser experience, and hence lesser salary require-
ments, was facially neutral and not intentionally discriminatory,
yet nonetheless had a discriminatory impact on the older appli-
cants.9 8 The court expressly noted that the distinction between dis-
parate impact and disparate treatment applies to age discrimina-
tion as well as to race and sex discrimination, 9 and held that the
92. Id. at 1320. The Mastie case generally has not been followed on this point.
93. 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977).
94. Id. at 659.
95. Laying off employees who do not possess necessary skills would be the neutral
employment practice. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
96. 433 F. Supp. at 661.
97. 481 F. Supp. 835. (D. Conn. 1979).
98. Id. at 839.
99. Id. at 837.
May 1981]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
disparate impact shown in this case made the employer's "neutral"
practice unlawful. 100 Thus, the distinction between disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment cases and the corresponding notions
of necessary discriminatory motive have now been applied to
ADEA cases.
The ADEA Prima Facie Case
Geller indicates that prima facie cases of disparate impact can
be established in ADEA actions in the same manner as in Title VII
actions.10 1 Class action prima facie cases of disparate treatment
may also be established in the same manner in ADEA actions as in
Title VII actions. 02 There is, however, a very important factor in
the disparate treatment model used for most individual claims
under Title VIP03 that, in some jurisdictions, is not necessary for
individual prima facie cases under the ADEA.
In suits by individuals under Title VII, the term "protected
class" does more than just define the plaintiff. Individual claims of
disparate treatment cannot arise under Title VII if the employer
has awarded the job to another member of the protected class."0"
For example, an individual female complainant cannot claim sex
discrimination if the opportunity in question was awarded to an-
other female. This is the necessary legal result of regarding all
members of the protected class equally, which presents no problem
under Title VII because race, sex, and the other Title VII classifi-
cations are fixed and discontinuous. Age, however, is a continuous
variable. 0 5 The question thus becomes: "Should sixty year old em-
ployees be regarded as equal to forty year old employees?" This is
not to ask whether sixty year old plaintiffs should receive a differ-
100. Id. at 839.
101. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
102. See Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1979); Lindsey v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d. 1123 (5th Cir. 1977); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 EmpL Prac.
Dec. 7902 (D.N.M. 1977), aff'd sub. nom. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1
31,175 (10th Cir. 1980).
103. See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
104. See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
105. "Continuous and discontinuous" are used here in their mathematical sense. A
light switch is an example of a discontinuous function; it is either on or off. Race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin are similarly discontinuous; one either belongs or does not
belong to the particular class. A light dimmer, however, is an example of a continuous func-
tion. It has a theoretically infinite number of settings between off and full brightness. So
too, with age, there exists a theoretically infinite number of ages from birth to death.
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ent measure of protection than forty year old plaintiffs, but rather,
whether it is unlawful to replace, on the basis of age, a sixty year
old protected worker with a forty year old protected worker. Fol-
lowing Title VII precedent, some courts have held that this prac-
tice is not unlawful. 106 A number of opinions, however, have recog-
nized that such blind adherence to Title VII is contrary to the
spirit of the ADEA. 107 As a result, in contrast to Title VII, a prima
facie case of individual disparate treatment under the ADEA
should not require that the job be given to an unprotected individ-
ual. One court has stated that even replacement by an individual
of equal age may not preclude a claim.10 8! Thus, in ADEA cases the
term "protected class" functions only as a determinant of proper
plaintiffs.
Statistical Analysis in ADEA Cases
The technique of percentage comparisons of groups as used in
Title VIH 09 cases also has been used effectively in ADEA cases." 0
If discrimination within the protected class is unlawful, however, a
comparison of protected to unprotected workers will not reveal
whether or not discrimination within the protected class is pre-
sent."' Recognizing this failing, some courts have drawn lines of
comparison at ages tailored to the age groups in which the discrim-
ination is alleged to have occurred in a particular case."" To be
106. See Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1977); Marshall v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Corp., 554 F.2d 730, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Sealtest
Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1974).
107. See Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. 357, 363-64 (N.D. Ga. 1979);
Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362, 372 (D. Md. 1978); Polstorff v. Fletcher,
452 F. Supp. 17, 24 (D. Ala. 1978).
108. Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. 357, 366 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
109. See notes 76-80 & accompanying text supra.
110. See, e.g., Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1979); Polstorff v.
Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ala. 1978); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1
7902 (D.N.M. 1977), aff'd sub. nom. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 EmpL Prac. Dec. 31,175
(10th Cir. 1980).
111. For example, a defendant could replace all workers over the age of 60 with work-
ers in their forties, yet the percentage of protected workers employed would remain
constant.
112. See Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1979) (two compari-
sons done, one with the employees subdivided at age 50 and the other with the employees
subdivided at age 60); Polstorff v. Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17, 22 (D. Ala. 1978) (comparison
with the employees subdivided at age 55); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 EmpL Prac. Dec.
7902, at 6499, 6504-05 (D.N.M. 1977), aff'd sub. nom. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 EmpL. Prac.
Dec. 31,175 (10th Cir. 1980) (two comparisons done, one with the employees subdivided at
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statistically valid, such group comparisons must involve large sam-
ple sizes.11s If the disparity between the groups is dramatic,1 4 the
harm of missing "within group" discrimination is not noticed.1 5 If
the disparity is not dramatic, however, this deficiency may be criti-
cal. In addition, the validity of the results is questionable because
grouping data for the purpose of analysis may overly dramatize the
results. Such arbitrary grouping should be considered data min-
ing."' Any line of comparison in a statistical test must be justifia-
ble independently of the data,117 but the only independently justi-
fiable age delineation is the legislative separation of protected and
unprotected individuals. Therefore, the best statistical tests for
ADEA cases are those that do not employ grouping.
Statistical Analysis in Age Discrimination Cases
Mean Analysis
The most common method of statistical analysis applicable to
age 50 and the other with the employees subdivided at age 60).
113. Percentage comparisons of groups are dependent upon the central limit theorem
which is valid only for large samples and populations. See notes 122, 131 & accompanying
text infra. See also Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1979) (sample of 156);
Polstorff v. Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ala. 1978) (sample of 350); Mistretta v. Sandia
Corp., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 117902 (D.N.M. 1977), aff'd sub. nom. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23
Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,175 (10th Cir. 1980) (sample of 306).
114. In Sun Oil, 24% of the employees laid off were over 60 years old, but only 3% of
the work force was over 60. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1979). In
Polstorff, 30% of the employees over 55 were adversely affected by the reorganization, while
only 3.5% of the employees under 55 were so affected. Polstorff v. Fletcher, 452 F. Supp. 17,
22 (D. Ala. 1978). In Mistretta, 81% of the employees over the age of 60 were adversely
affected by the reorganization, although only 5.9% of all employees were adversely affected.
Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 EmpL Prac. Dec. 1 7902, at 6499 (D.N.M. 1979), aff'd sub.
nom., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,175 (10th Cir. 1980).
115. Because of the judicial familiarity with percentage comparisons, such group com-
parisons may even be preferable. See Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7902,
at 6501 (D.N.M. 1979), affd sub. nom., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,175
at 17143 (10th Cir. 1980) (judge ignored plaintiff statistician's Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests in
favor of his own percentage analysis; later congratulated on the effort by the appellate
court).
116. See note 65 supra.
117. To illustrate this precept, suppose OXOXXO A 000 B XXX represents twelve
employees ordered according to age where line A represents the age of 40, and line B, the
age of 50. Further assume that the X's were fired and the O's retained. If the "above 40"
group is compared to the "below 40" group (line A), each group suffered 50% layoffs, and no
evidence of discrimination is established. If the comparison is made at age 50 (line B), how-
ever, then the above 50 group had 100% layoffs, compared to only 33% of the below 50
group, and discrimination seems evident.
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age discrimination cases that does not require grouping is a com-
parison of mean118 ages. For example, if an employer randomly
selects 50 employees (the sample) out of a possible 500 (the popu-
lation), the mean age of the selected employees will, to some de-
gree of probability, resemble the mean age of the entire popula-
tion.119 The larger the population and sample size, the closer the
resemblance should be.120 The various possible means of many ran-
dom samples taken from the population will always be normally
distributed 21 around the mean of the population. 122 The expected
value of the sample mean is exactly that of the population mean,1 23
but the observed mean (OM) of any sample may not exactly equal
the expected mean (EM); the theorem only predicts that it will
probably be very close.12 ' The further from the expected mean any
observed sample mean is, the more unlikely its occurrence will
be.125 The likelihood of a particular observed mean occurring can
be calculated using the formula
(OM - EM) x 2/sample size
1 20
standard deviation
and the z table. 27
118. The "mean" is the arithmetig average. See note 159 infra.
119. This precept is known as the law of large numbers or the law of averages. See
FREUND & WLiAsS, supra note 46, at 143; OKmn & DROGIN, supra note 41, at 95-98.
120. See notes 130-131 & accompanying text infra.
121. A "normal" distribution is one in which the frequency of values is highest at the
mean and tapers off symmetrically as one moves farther from the mean in either direction.
For example, the series 1,2,2,3,3,3,4,4,5 is roughly a normal distribution about the value "3."
The graph of a normal distribution is the familiar "bell-shaped" curve. For another example
of a normal distribution, see note 47 supra. See generally ORw & DRowN, supra note 41,
at 67-68; FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 69-84.
122. See OaKrN & DROGIN, supra note 41, at 85. The statistical theory upon which
these precepts are based is known as the central limit theorem. See generally FREUND &
WmLuAs, supra note 46, at 252; Braun, supra note 54, at 70-71.
123. See FREEDmAN, supra note 43, at 255, 373.
124. Id.
125. See generally ORIN & DROGIN, supra note 41 at 85, 95-98. This precept also
parallels the example in notes 47-49 supra.
126. This is an algebraic simplification of the standard test formula-
observed value - expected value
z = standard error
See FREMmAN, supra note 43, at 443, where
s sample size x standard deviation
standard error -- sample size
Id. at 375; ORmaN & DROGIN, supra note 41, at 129.
127. The following is a one-tailed, as opposed to a two-tailed, z table. See notes 63-65
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The application of this formula can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing hypothetical: An employer fires 50 employees (the sample)
with a mean age of 38.9, years out of a population of 500 with a
mean age of 37.1 years and a standard deviation (SD) of 7 years.1 8
If the disparity between the two means results from chance, the
probability of its occurrence can be found by substituting these
values into the formula, which results in:
& accompanying text supra.
z score % z score %
1.00 84.14 1.50 93.32
1.05 85.32 1.55 93.94
1.10 86.44 1.60 94.52
1.15 87.50 1.65 95.06
1.20 88.50 1.70 95.55
1.25 89.44 1.75 96.00
1.30 90.32 1.80 .96.41
1.35 91.15 1.85 96.79
1.40 91.93 1.90 97.13
1.45 92.65 1.95 97.44
Negative z scores are read as if they were positive.
128. Standard deviation measures the dispersion of a set of data. Its relative size de-
pends upon how widely the data is dispersed, and is expressed as an interval to each side of
the mean such that approximately 68% of the data according to weight falls within 1 stan-
dard deviation of the mean, and 95% of the data falls within 2 standard deviations of the
mean. Using the example in the text, if the mean age of the population is 37.1, a standard
deviation of 7 years means that approximately 68% of the population is between 30.1 and
43.1 years old, and 95% of the population is between the ages of 23.1 and 50.1.
To calculate the standard deviation for a set of data, the mean is first determined. Each
value is then compared with the mean and the amount of deviation noted. The standard
deviation is the square root of the average of the squares of these deviations:
SD = .average of (deviations from average)'.
For example, to determine the standard deviation of the list 20,10,15, and 15, the first step
is to calculate the mean:
20 + 10 + 15 + 15
Mean = 4= 15.
The second step is to determine each deviation from the average by subtracting the average
from each entry. These deviations are: 5, -5, 0, and 0. Finally, the square root of the average
of the squares of the deviations is calculated.
sD= 5" +(-5)+0 2 + /25+ 25+0+ )
SD=4 4
= 12.5 = 354.
S 5'+(-5)'+0 +0' _ /25+25+0+0
SD V4 V -
-2 /i= 3.54.
FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 63. If the standard deviation of the population is not kno
and the sample is large enough, the standard deviation of the sample can be used as
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Z -- (38.9 - 37.1) x 1J50 - 1.82.7
From the z table, it is found that, of all possible samples of 50 out
of this population of 500, more than 96% would have had a mean
age of less than 38.9 years, which surpasses the significance level
required by most courts,129 and thus establishes evidence of dis-
crimination. The important fact to note from this example is that,
in cases involving large samples and populations, seemingly slight
variances in mean age can be significant.
Large samples and populations, however, are not commonly
present in ADEA cases. If the population size is not at least ten
times the sample size, the z score must be multiplied by a correc-
tion factor that decreases z, lessening the likelihood of signifi-
cance.130 More importantly, from the basic z formula, it is apparent
that as the sample size decreases, z decreases, even if the disparity
between the mean ages remains the same. Recomputing' the previ-
ous example with a sample size of twenty instead of fifty demon-
strates this effect:
Z - (38.9 - 37.1) x/r = 1.15.7
The corresponding percentage from the z table is only 87.5%-in-
sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that the difference resulted
from chance.
As the sample size decreases even further, not only does z con-
tinue to decrease, but the central limit theorem begins to break
down because the distribution of possible sample means is no
longer normal." l If the age distribution in the population itself
were near normal, a t test could be used for samples smaller than
twenty;" 2 but there is no reason to expect an age distribution to be
normal. 3 s Generally, samples of less than twenty are inadequate
129. See note 61 & accompanying text infra.
130. The correction factor for these high sample-to-population ratios is:I population size - sample size
V population size - 1
FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 331.
131. See ORKIN & DnoWN, supra note 41, at 85, 98.
132. A t-score is calculated using the same formula as a z-score, but different tables
are used depending on the sample size. See FlmnmAN, supra note 43, at 463-65; ORKIN &
DROGIN, supra note 41, at 132-36; Braun, supra note 54, at 74 n.76, 89 app. A.
133. See note 138 & accompanying text infra.
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for mean analysis in ADEA cases. Instead, the analysis of small
samples is dependent upon nonparametric analysis.'3
Nonparametric Analysis for Cases of Small Sample Size
Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corporation3 5
In 1971, Great Lakes Steel Corporation was forced to shut
down one of its mills and absorb the foremen from that mill into
its operations at another mill. Two of the foremen could not be
absorbed and were laid off. Mastie and Seymour, both age 56,
claimed that they were chosen for dismissal because of their age.
At trial, it was determined that the relevant population consisted
of the individuals in Table 1.138
Table 1
* =laid off
NAME AGE RANK
Petosky 61 1
Mastie* 56 2
Sawicki 56 3
Seymour* 56 4
Eastman 54 5
Cason 54 6
Haskamp 52 7
Gardner 48 8
Hanak 47 9
Ransom 47 10
Romanowski 43 11
Taurence 43 12
Beard 40 13
Redman 39 14
Roman 37 15
Judd 33 16
Michaelis 33 17
Dupier 29 18
Gregoire 28 19
134. See generally J. BRADLEY, DISmTRmUTION FREE STATISTICAL TESTS (1968); C. KR
& C. VAN EEDEN, A NONPARAmEmC INTRODUCTION TO STATIMTCS (1968).
135. 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
136. Id. at 1303.
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The average age of the foremen before the shutdown was
45.05; after the shutdown, the average age was 43.76. The court
held that this difference of 1.29 years was not sufficient evidence to
indicate discrimination. 3' However, even if the defendant had a
blatantly discriminatory policy under which it intentionally re-
leased the very oldest employees, thus laying off Petosky rather
than Seymour or Mastie, the average age still would have de-
creased only 1.58 years, demonstrating that even the most blatant
discrimination would not have appeared significant in a compari-
son of means. This example demonstrates the potentially deceptive
use of conventional statistical analysis when a small sample size is
taken from a population that is not normally distributed.138 Ironi-
cally, after mishandling these statistics, the Mastie court went on
to make general pronouncements on the use of statistics in age dis-
crimination cases. 3"
When the sample size is too small for mean comparisons, a
line drawing analysis might be used with some justification. Sup-
pose that a line were drawn in Table 1 just below the four oldest
employees (the dashed line). Both released employees came from
this subgroup comprised of the four oldest employees. If all of the
names were thrown into a hat and then two names were drawn out
one at a time, the chances of one of the subgroup being picked are
four out of nineteen, or 4/19. For the second draw, there would be
only eighteen names in the hat, three of them from the subgroup.
The chances of one of the subgroup being picked on the second
draw are 3/18, or 1/6. To determine the chance that one of the
subgroup would be picked on both draws, the chances are multi-
plied together:140 4/19 x 1/6 = 4/114 = 3.51%. Thus, 96.49% of all
possible choices of two would have included at least one person
outside the subgroup; 1 this evidence would be statistically signifi-
137. Id. at 1319-20.
138. The most obvious sign that a population is not normally distributed is the inci-
dence of multiple individuals it the extreme ends of the distribution. This situation is
demonstrated in Mastie by the bunching of employees at the "extreme" ages of 33, 54, and
56. See note 121 supra.
139. See note 92 & accompanying text supra.
140. Only totally independent chances can be multiplied together. In this instance, the
second draw was made independently of the first by subtracting 1 from the pool of 19, but
creating independence is not always as simple as this example would indicate. See FREED-
MAN, supra note 43, at 212-17; ORKIN & DROGIN, supra note 41, at 42-46.
141. This test is one-tailed because the samples consisting of both draws coming from
a subgroup of the four youngest individuals were considered less, rather than equally, dis-
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cant in most courts. The important fact to be noted in this analysis
is that it does not use the law of large numbers142 or the central
limit theorem 143 in any way, and therefore the small sample limita-
tion involved with those precepts and their corresponding tests14 4
is not present.
The above conclusion, which was reached by multiplying 4/19
by 3/18, works well for simple cases, but for more complex exam-
ples, combination theory must be used. Combination theory is used
to solve problems such as: How many distinct"45 groups of two can
be chosen from a group of four? From a group of four things num-
bered 1,2,3,4, there are six possible distinct groups of two:
1 and 2, 1 and 3, 1 and 4,
2 and 3, 2 and 4,
3 and 4.
This common sense listing is feasible for small numbers, but is
somewhat overwhelming if used to determine, for example, how
many groups of two can be chosen from a group of nineteen. For-
tunately, mathematicians have proved that the number of groups
of size "n" that can be chosen out of a larger group of size "m" is
m! 146
n! x (m-n)! .
Testing this formula on the simple example of two items chosen
from a group of four:
4! 4! (4 x 3 x 2 x 1) 24
-- =--6.
2! x (4-2)! 2! x 2! (2 x 1) x (2 x 1) 4
Applying the formula to the number of groups of two that can be
chosen from a group of nineteen, which was the size of the group in
Mastie, yields:
19! 19! 19 x 18 342
. - - = 171.
2! x (19 - 2)! 2! x 17! 2 x 1 2
criminatory. See notes 64-65 & accompanying text supra.
142. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
143. See notes 122-23 & accompanying text supra.
144. The tests referred to are the z test, see note 126 supra, and the t test, see note
132 supra.
145. "Distinct" means that the order of the group is not considered. For example, the
group (2,3) is not distinct from the group (3,2). "Groups," as used hereafter, will refer to
distinct groups.
146. This is also termed the "binomial coefficient." See generally FREmAEN, supra
note 43, at 231-36. The symbol ! means factorial. By definition, A! = A x (A - 1) x
(A-2) x(A-3)... 1. Thus8!= 8x7x6x5x4x3x2x1.
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Thus, in Mastie there were 171 total possible groups of two that
could have been chosen out of the nineteen men. Six of those pos-
sibilities could have had both choices in a subgroup of the four
oldest 'employees. The percentage of possible samples in which
both choices came from the subgroup of four equaled:
6 4 3
-= .0351 = -x--
171 19 18
As in any line drawing, subgrouping done for the purpose of
statistical analysis should be justified independently of the data.147
It is important to determine how the subgroup was chosen. In this
case, the line distinguishes those instances of discrimination that
would be equal to or greater than that represented by the dismissal
of Mastie and Seymour. Any choice of two within the subgroup
would have represented discrimination of at least this magnitude.
Therefore, 3.51% of all possible cases would have been equally or
more discriminatory. Although this justification is not totally inde-
pendent of the data, it is not easily attacked.
The necessity for any justification is spared, however, if a
probabilistic test that does not require subgrouping is used, such
as the Mann-Whitney, or "rank sum," test.148 Suppose the nine-
teen employees in Mastie are sequentially ranked according to age
as shown in Table 1." 4e These rank numbers, instead of names,
could be put on the slips of paper going into the hat. If the rank
numbers on the two slips drawn out of the hat were added, their
"rank sum" could be as low as 3 (1 + 2), as high as 37 (19 + 18),
or any number in between. There could be 171 different possible
147. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
148. Mann & Whitney, On a Test of Whether One of Two Random Variables Is Sta-
tistically Larger than the Other, 18 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 50 (1947) (ex-
tending a test first developed by Wilcoxon, Individual Comparisons by Ranking Methods, 1
Biommcs 80 (1945)). See generally J. BRADLEY, DiSTS IUTIoN-FREE STATISTICAL TESTS
(1968); K. BURY, STATISTICAL MODELS IN APPLIED SCIENCE (1975); W. HAYS & R. WINKLER,
STATISTICS: PROBABILrrY, INFERENCE AND DECISION (2d ed. 1975); C. CRA & C. vAN EE DN,
A NONPARAMETRIC INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS (1968); ORKIN & DROGIN, supra note 41;
White, The Use of Ranks in a Test of Significance for Comparing Two Treatments, 8 Bio-
mETmcs 33 (1952).
149. This ranking assumes that the exact age of each person is known, as if, for exam-
ple, Taurence were some months or days older than Romanowski. If the exact age is not
known, then those who have equal ages should receive the average rank for their age.
Taurence and Romanowski, for instance, would each have a rank of (11 + 12)/2 = 11 .
Seymour, Sawicki, and Mastie would each have a rank of (2 + 3 + 4)/ = 3.
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combinations drawn.150 However, some of the sums would be more
likely to arise than others because, although there is only one way
to draw either of the extreme values of 3 or 37, there are, for exam-
ple, four possible ways to draw the rank sum of 10.51 In fact, the
probabilities for the various possible rank sums are normally dis-
tributed around a mode of 20, the value exactly midway between
the extreme endpoints of 3 and 37. This distribution represents the
operation of a chance model of two randomly chosen layoffs.
Table 2152 shows, for populations up to size thirty,58 the criti-
cal points for a two-tailed rank sum comparison of two groups for a
5% level of significance. A rank sum value less than or equal to the
appropriate critical point surpasses the significance level and es-
tablishes a prima facie case of discrimination.
Table 2
n, (smaller group)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
10
11 17
12 18 26
13 20 27 36
14 21 29 38 49
15 22 31 40 51
15 23 32 42 53
16 24 34 44 55
17 26 35 46 58
18 27 37 48 60
19 28 38 50 63
20 29 40 52 65
21 31 42 54 67
21 32 43 56 70
22 33 45 58 72
23 34 46 60 74
24 35 48 62 77
25 37 50 64 79
26 38 51 66 82
27 39 53 68
28 40 55
28 42
29
63
65 78
68 81 96
71 85 99 115
73 88 103 119 137
76 91 106 123 141 160
79 94 110 127 145 164 185
82 97 114 131 150 169
84 100 117 135 154
87 103 121 139
90 107 124
93 110
95
150. See text following note 144 supra.
151. The four combinations are: 9+1, 8+2, 7+3, and 6+4.
152. Verdooreen, Extended Tables of Critical Values for Wilcoxon's Test Statistic, 50
BxiomE KA 177 (1963), reprinted in White, The Use of Ranks in a Test of Significance for
Comparing Two Treatments, 8 BiommTrcs 33, 37 (1952). Other Mann-Whitney/Wilcoxon
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
-~17
18
.~19
0
21
22
o 23
24
25
26,
27
28
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This table gives the critical points for the lowest possible rank sum
of nI, which means first that ni must be less than n2,'" and second
that the rank sum of nI must be the lesser sum based on either
older-to-younger ordering or younger-to-older ordering. For Mas-
tie, the smaller group (n) is the group laid off, and the smaller n,
rank sum is attained by ordering oldest to youngest, as done in
Table 1. Therefore, n., = 2, n2 = 19 - 2 = 17, and the rank sum
of nj = 2+4 = 6. According to the table, the 5% critical point for
n =  2 and n2 = 17 is 5, which means that the Mastie evidence
was not quite within 5% significance. This result seems to conflict
with the subgrouping method, which placed the result as within
5% significance, unless it is considered that the rank sum table
shown is two-tailed, while the other calculation was one-tailed,1 55
illustrating the difference that the choice of a one-tailed or two-
tailed test can make on borderline significance.
Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co.
The Mann-Whitney test is clearly superior to the subgrouping
methods when the entire sample does not come from the extreme
end of the age spectrum. Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co.15 6 illus-
trates this more common fact situation. Table 3 shows the employ-
ees of Monsanto's manufacturing department.15 7
tables can be found in J. BRADLEY, DISTRIBUTION-FRm STATISTICAL TESTS 199 (1968); C.
KRAr' & C. VAN EEDEN, A NoNPARAmmTc INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS 318-22 (1968);
ORKIN & DROGIN, supra note 41, at 366-67.
153. For larger samples and populations a z test can be used. See W. HAYs & R. WIN-
KLER, STATISTICS: PROBABILITY, INFERENCE AND DECISION 829 (2d ed. 1975).
154. Therefore, n. will be either the chosen or the unchosen group, whichever contains
the least number of people.
155. See note 141 supra. The one-tailed critical rank sum for n, - 2 and n, =17 is 6.
C. KRAFT & C. VAN EE.DEN, A NONPARAMETRIc INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS 214 (1968). Thus
using a one-tailed Mann-Whitney test, the result would have been found to be significant.
However, because the Mann-Whitney test is not based upon line drawing, even if the choice
of tails is consistent with that of a line drawing analysis, the resultant probability values will-
not be exactly the same. This result occurs because the Mann-Whitney test reveals the
"within group" discrimination that the line drawing concealed.
156. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970). Mastie cited this case because it also com-
pared average ages before and after layoffs and found no significance in a small change. 424
F. Supp. 1299, 1320 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
157. Brief for Respondent at exhibit E, Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp.
1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
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Table 3
la- id off
NAME AGE RANK
Burns * 59 1
Hatch 59 2
McCune 58 3
Dumas 58 4
McCroskey * 57 5
Phillips * 57 6
Stringfellow * 56 7
Faulkner * 56 8
Wells * 55 9
McDonald * 55 10
Kundert 54 11
---------------------.--------------- median --------------------------------------
Neuberger 54 12
Wilkinson * 53 13
Rhoades 53 14
Moorhead 51 15
Lynn 49 16
Cunningham 48 17
Kjeldgaard 48 18
Post 47 19
Franks * 45 20
Cameron * 43 21
Boldine 39 22
The average age before the shutdown was 52.5 and the average age
after the shutdown was 51.5, a decrease in average age of one year.
As in Mastie, the change in average age does not appear signifi-
cant. Inspection of the list itself, however, gives the impression
that older workers bore the brunt of the layoffs. The problem with
applying the same line drawing technique utilized in Mastie is also
apparent. The laid-off employees are scattered throughout the age
spectrum rather than clustered at one end. Any subgrouping would
probably be attacked as data mining.
The Mann-Whitney test, however, is still applicable. In this
case, as in Mastie, the smaller n, is the group laid off, which makes
n2 equal to 12 (22 - 10). The smaller rank sum of n, is again at-
tained by ordering from oldest to youngest, with the sum equaling
100. Given the data values in Stringfellow, the two-tailed critical
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sum for a 5% level of significance is 85.158 Because 100 is not less
than or equal to the critical sum value of 85, most courts would not
consider the statistical evidence as valid.
A line drawing analysis could be achieved in this instance by
the use of the "median." 5 ' Returning to Table 3, the preshutdown
median (dashed line) is 54; eleven values are higher and eleven
lower. Seven employees from the group older than the median were
released, but only three from the group younger than the median
lost their jobs.
As in Mastie, the problem can be modeled by assuming that if
all of the employees were equally competent, the layoffs could have
been determined by drawing the names from a hat. If the names of
the eleven younger employees were written on red slips of paper,
the names of the eleven older employees written on blue slips of
paper, and all the slips placed into the same hat, what is the
probability that a random selection of ten names would contain
seven or more on blue slips of paper? Because the actual selection
had seven names in the older group, the selection of seven or more
individuals in the blue group represents age discrimination that
would be equal to or greater than that presented in Stringfellow. °0
The total number of groups of 10 that could have been drawn
out of 22 would equal all of the possible samples that could have
been drawn. According to the formula for combinations,6 1 this
would equal:
! 22x 12! 646,646.
The percentage of those total possibilities that could have split 7
blue to 3 red, plus those that could have split 8 blue to 2 red, plus
those that could have split 9 blue to 1 red, plus those that could
have split 10 blue to 0 red would equal the percentage of cases in
which the discrimination was equal to or greater than that present
158. See text accompanying note 152 supra.
159. It is important not to confuse "median" with "mean." The mean is a weighted
average, and the median is the middle value, with 50% of the values lower and 50% higher.
For example, the median of the series 1,2,3,4,5, is 3, with 50% of the values lower (1 and 2)
and 50% of the values higher (4 and 5). The mean for this series is also 3 (15/5). If the series
were 1,2,3,4,10, however, the mean would be 4 (20/5), although the median would still be 3
(1 and 2 lower, 4 and 10 higher).
160. The seven or more names on red slips of paper (the younger half) are considered
to be less discriminatory, making this a one-tailed test. See notes 62-65 & accompanying
text supra.
161. See note 146 & accompanying text supra.
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in the Stringfellow fact situation.
To find the number of cases that could have split 7 to 3, the
number of groups of 7 that could be chosen from 11 names in the
blue half first must be calculated according to the formula for
combinations.
1 1 ! I I1 x 1 0 x 9 x 8 L L I O x 3 = 3 01 -- 1x0xx 11x10x3 =330.
7! x 4! 4 x 3 x 2
Each of these 330 cases could be matched with any one of the pos-
sible groups of three from the eleven in the red half, which equals:
11
- 165.
8! x 3!
The total number of possible combinations of the 7 to 3 split
would be 330 x 165 = 54,450. Similarly, the total number of possi-
ble 8-2 splits equals:
1l! II!
8!x3!' 9!x2! 9,075.
The number of 9-1 possibilities equals 605 and the number of 10 to
0 possibilities equals 11.162 The total of all splits 7 to 3 or worse is
54,450 + 9,075 + 605 + 11 = 64,141. The ratio of these groups to
all of the possible groups of 10 chosen from 22 would be
64,141 = .099 or 9.9%.
646,646
Thus, 91.1% of all possible selections would have been less dis-
criminatory. This result is consistent with the Mann-Whitney
analysis insofar as neither shows significance.
The weak point of this example, in addition to its failure to
detect discrimination within each side of the median, is its
linedrawing. The median is an arbitrary but standard dividing line
used throughout statistics. Use of the median is defensible, but
only on the basis of convention and simplicity. Other than the
Mastie-type subgrouping, 168 the median may be the only type of
small sample linedrawing that is defensible against charges of data
mining.
162. If application of the formula gives a number that is sufficiently low, it is a good
idea to verify the result with a common sense approach. In the case of the 10 to 0 split, it is
easy to determine how many groups of 10 can be chosen from the 11 people in the older half
if one realizes that each group of 10 leaves out only one of the 11. There would thus be 11
possible groups. Common sense verification gives confidence in the chosen formula and ren-
ders the problem less abstract.
163. See text following note 139 supra.
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Conclusion
Title VH has laid the foundation for the use of statistical evi-
dence in ADEA cases. But the courts have recognized that, unlike
race or sex discrimination, age discrimination can take place within
the protected class. Hence, the percentage comparisons used in Ti-
tle VII cases are inapplicable to age cases, and most other types of
data grouping are difficult to justify. Statistical analysis in ADEA
cases is most appropriately done on an individual age basis. For
large samples, this is best accomplished with mean analysis; for
small samples, the Mann-Whitney test is particularly useful.

